Transcripts of the monetary policymaking body of the Federal Reserve from 2002–2008.

Thank you, Debby. Regarding the longer-term TAF, a transition from the current biweekly schedule of 28-day auctions, $75 billion each, to a schedule of biweekly 84-day auctions, $25 billion each, will require four additional biweekly auctions of 28-day credit for an eight-week period. We need to do this to keep the amount of TAF credit outstanding at $150 billion. We contemplate a schedule that permits us to auction the 84-day credit of $25 billion on the now-typical Monday “cycle,” announce these results Tuesday morning, and then auction 28-day credit Tuesday afternoon. The two auctions will settle Thursday of that week, the day other TAF credit matures.

We are also requesting that we enhance the collateral protection for the Reserve Banks against term loans. Specifically, we are seeking a collateral cushion on term loans. The cushion is meant to provide protection to Reserve Banks if there are unanticipated needs for overnight credit during the term of the loan as well as serve as a collateral buffer that provides for deterioration in the value of the collateral or the creditworthiness of the depository institution (DI). This would apply to both TAF loans and term primary credit loans. Currently, there is a requirement that a TAF auction bid, plus other term credit that will be concurrently outstanding, not exceed 50 percent of available collateral. However, this requirement is only for the time when the bid is submitted. We imposed this as a modest measure of comfort that DIs would have adequate access to collateral to cover unanticipated needs for additional credit during the term of the TAF loan. This collateral cushion has not been an element of the term primary credit borrowing program, first introduced in August 2007. Under the current collateral policy for the TAF bids, we observe that some DIs add collateral just before an auction and withdraw the excess amount after the auction. That is, they do not maintain the cushion during the actual term of the loan.

Particularly for the longer-term TAF and also for the term primary credit loans, we feel that Reserve Banks should have access to additional collateral. As I noted above, this would provide a cushion for unanticipated needs for additional credit during the term of the loan and for deterioration in the value of the collateral or the creditworthiness of the DI. An alternative would be to alter the haircuts themselves, but that could have other negative market consequences. In fact, for that reason, the Federal Reserve stated publicly in August that it was not changing its haircuts amid the uncertain market conditions. Specifically, the requirement we are proposing is that a DI’s aggregate term borrowings not exceed 75 percent of available collateral. Most current holders of term credit have sufficient collateral to meet this requirement. We do not feel that this will restrict participation in any significant way. As is the case currently, the terms for TAF bidding and outstanding extensions of credit will require that Reserve Banks be collateralized to their satisfaction and that they take additional measures, including the right to ask for more collateral or to call a loan, if they feel insecure. Other terms of the auctions will remain as they are today: maximum bids and awards of 10 percent of the auction size, minimum bid size of $10 million, maximum of two bid rates, minimum bid rate based on the OIS rate, et cetera. These seem to have been working well, and we see no need to request any changes. We would be happy to answer your questions. Thank you.

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