Transcripts of the monetary policymaking body of the Federal Reserve from 2002–2008.

I understand, but if you really follow the logic of the argument about being large and systemically important, if we draw a line somewhere, we start expanding this now bit by bit and we draw a line somewhere, and the question then becomes, Will markets begin to question other countries on the periphery and create problems? It’s not that any one of them— 552 U.S.C. (b)(4)

, I don’t know, pick one—is large and systemically important, but by doing what we’re doing and creating the uncertainty that President Lacker was referring to, maybe we are forced to go and do it collectively because they all band together and as a group say, “We’re all facing this problem. Why can’t we have the same access?” Partly I like President Rosengren’s suggestion about using repos with securities, which we have here as a mechanism. Alternatively, if the IMF is creating a largely unconditional or low conditionality type of program, why not just say that everybody else goes to them first? If they tap out of the IMF access, maybe then we might consider being a backstop rather than their coming to us in the first place. I just don’t know where this ends. I think that, with all of the questions you raised and tried to answer, you hit it right on the head. On all of them that you said were kind of marginal, you went one way, and I’m leaning the other way on the same criteria.

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