Transcripts of the monetary policymaking body of the Federal Reserve from 2002–2008.

I think you put your finger on two very difficult judgments that we made when structuring this facility. I don’t see the risk of creating stigma for emerging market economies that are not in our swap network as being a first-order concern. It is broadly recognized that the folks that we are recommending are larger, more systemically important, and as well managed as anybody else. If you were sitting down to make a list—and the Fund has recently done this—the economies that we’re recommending would be at the top of the list, and I think that is recognized by essentially all observers. So I see what we’re doing here as really ratifying perceptions rather than creating new ones.

On the second point, the choice between the swaps versus the repos, that one is particularly tricky. I very much agree that the repos would give us a little more security. On the other hand, the swap framework gives the emerging market economies a little more flexibility. As to how they are going to proceed, as President Fisher mentioned, it also creates symmetry between the industrial countries and the way we’re treating them and the emerging markets and the way we’re treating them. Given the successes of many of these economies over the past ten years, I see this as being an appropriate step. Nevertheless, I admit that the choice between the swaps and the repos is a difficult one. Another thought is that the repo structure might provide a bit more security, but we have tried to get that security through other ways—through tranching, careful reviews, and so on.

Keyboard shortcuts

j previous speech k next speech