Transcripts of the monetary policymaking body of the Federal Reserve from 2002–2008.

Mr. Chairman, before I get started, I do think that President Plosser has raised good issues on the governance matter. I hope that we will continue to discuss this, bearing in mind that there may be changes in the composition of the governors with a new President and given the faith that we built up with the existing governors, so that we have to get at least our lines of understanding clear as we go through time. As to the alternatives that we face, the problem with the economy isn’t the interbank lending rate or even the riskless rate. The problem with the economy and with the financial markets is that intermediation has broken down. I think our actions should forcefully be directed toward the clearing of blockages in the financial plumbing and not just fiddling with the faucet. It’s the availability and distribution of credit that is problematic.

In that sense I like alternative A. In fact, President Stern, I like its ambiguity, and I’ll tell you why. I am quite worried that stating zero to 25 basis points will bring down upon us the wrath of bankers. I do think it’s important that community banks be profitable and that they be healthy. First Vice President Cumming pointed this out in her comments, and to me this alternative gives us substantial wiggle room, as it were, in its ambiguity. Vice Chairman Kohn pointed out that paragraph 5 is good for the bankers. Without stating a specific target fed funds rate, it allows them to price their loans according to how they see fit. That appears to be taking place anyway. There is a separation between the fed funds rate and the prime loan rate. So unless I’m missing something, bankers should positively interpret both paragraph 1 and paragraph 5 in terms of their operating leeway.

I would suggest that this is an important step forward in making clear the way we’re going to operate henceforth. It does indicate a regime change, and as President Bullard pointed out, I think we have to be forceful in doing so. I could diddle with the language, but to be even more forceful I would transpose paragraph 4 and paragraph 3. That is, the first two paragraphs strike me as fine. At this juncture I would not put in an inflation target because I don’t think we’re prepared for it as a Committee. I’m comfortable leaving in paragraph 2 that we see some risk that inflation could decline below optimal rates for a time. After all, we just got the number that makes that very clear—minus 1.7 on the headline rate. But then I would go immediately into what our focus is going to be. I rather like President Plosser’s one edit to make clear that it’s the focus of the FOMC’s policy. After we have laid that clear—and if, indeed, just parenthetically we are going to make some Treasury purchases, we should include that in there; if we are not, we should not—then in what would be paragraph 4, strike “in current circumstances” and say that “the Committee judged that it was not useful to set a specific target for the fed funds rate.” You’re making it very clear that we have a regime change. As to the content of paragraph 4, assuming we are going to be purchasing longer-term Treasuries, I’d leave it as it is. Stay on message. Repeat it over and over and over again. You started with your speech in Austin, and that makes it operative. I have no problem with it, and I would urge it be included as written.

So my suggestions, in summary, are that we embrace alternative A; we transpose paragraphs 4 and 3; we take out the wording “in current circumstances” because obviously we’re judging things in current circumstances; and we not include an inflation target at this juncture but do include the rest of the bracketed language in paragraph 2. I believe this is sellable to our bankers, and I believe it’s a good way to proceed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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