The way that I’m referring to it is just that risk premiums are really, really large. I’m not saying that they are necessarily irrational. I am just saying that they are really, really large.

You don’t, but you can take a guess at what you think that is, and it is higher. It is not at Great Depression levels under any of the models I’ve looked at. It’s not even at the levels of default rates in 2002.

You could think about what the default risk is, say, for the corporate sector. You could break down a pretty simple model of defaults conditional upon our outlook for the economy, and that would have the default rate rising.

In the CP market itself?

I think that the decline in the A2/P2 overnight suggests improvement. But there is some concern about sample selection, and you have to worry about that at the same time. It could be just that you are getting higher-quality issuers in the A2/P2 sector. But it turns out ...

I think it is very difficult to interpret it that way because the intervention did happen and the bulk of the improvements happened subsequent to the intervention.

I’m Dan Covitz.

I don’t know those data.

I think over history this isn’t the only time when A2/P2s have come under stress. Whenever there were disruptions in the market—for example, after the California utilities defaulted in the early part of the decade—A2/P2 outstandings plummeted, and A2/P2 spreads rose, though not nearly ...

As you go out the term, it is even more.

Thank you. I will be using the packet of charts that starts with the staff presentation on financial markets. The charts for the other two presentations are included in this packet and follow mine. As shown in the top left panel of your first exhibit, long-term nominal Treasury yields posted ...